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Background
In Ahmedabad City, almost 40% of its five million residents 
live in slums and chawls. There are about 400 slum pockets 
and 350 chawls. Almost all chawls are on private lands while 
20% slums are on government land and the remaining 80% 
are on private land.
Chawls were originally built by mill owners to house 
workers. They are 2 room structures with common water 
and sanitation facilities. Today, because the chawls house 
more than double the planned population, the existing in-
frastructure is overstretched.
Up to the mid-nineties, slums in Ahmedabad City could 
not access basic services at a household level. Inadequate 
water supply (public stand posts) and sanitation facilities 
(public toilets) were provided. Drainage at the household level 
was non–existent. The result was long queues and frequent 
quarrels amongst women (mostly) at the water stand posts, 
overflowing and dirty public toilets, and waste from houses 
flowed into the lanes, which doubled up as open gutters. All 
in all this created a serious health hazard.
The perspectives of slum residents, who were the end us-
ers, were not considered when the provision of basic water 
and sanitation services in slums of Ahmedabad City was 
planned. The views and vested interests prevailing amongst 
planners, civic authorities, politicians and civil society up 
to the mid-nineties were:
• Slum residents cannot afford to pay for basic services.
• Slum residents were squatters who did not have legal 
title to land and therefore it was not possible to provide 
basic services.
• A minimalist approach towards provision of public 
services in slums.
• Elected representatives saw slum residents as vote banks 
and wanted their patronage to continue. This motive led 
to the provision of free public services in exchange for 
votes, which the city could not afford.
The innovation 
The provision of basic services in slums was re-thought after 
the city of Surat in Gujarat was hit by the Plague in 1994. It 
was assumed that a major reason for the outbreak of Plague 
was the unsanitary conditions in the slums of Surat.
In Ahmedabad City, an innovative approach, which has 
gained the popular title of Slum Networking Project (SNP) 
was designed. In SNP, the major innovations (and deviations 
from traditional approaches) were:
• Provision of basic water and sanitation services at a 
household level by the ULB 
• Contribution by slum residents towards costs of installing 
basic services
• The role of the NGO as an interface between the ULB 
and slum communities
• A guarantee of non-eviction for 10 years by the ULB
• 100% coverage of slums
The basic services provided at the household level included 
a toilet, a drainage connection and a water connection, and 
Traditionally, provision of water and sanitation at the household level to slum residents was not seen as a priority by ULBs: 
the mechanisms for obtaining such services were typically absent. The vacuum was filled by middlemen, who charged 
huge amounts for sub-standard services. In Ahmedabad City, India, the ULB, slum residents and NGOs have developed 
an innovative system to bring accountability and reduced corruption to the provision of watsan services. The mainstay of 
the system is charging affordable user fees, this ensures that the users – slum residents – have leverage to ensure quality 
in the installation and maintenance of services. The paper starts by describing the traditional approach to the provision 
of water and sanitation before presenting the innovation. Pro-poor accountability arrangements are then listed. Three 
examples follow that show what happened when the innovation was put into practice; the first is of a slum, the second of 
a middleman and the third of a resident.
Components of SNP Amount of contribution by partners
AMC Slum Residents NGO
Physical Infrastructure 10,000 2,000 0
Community Mobilisation 700 0 300
Resident Associations 0 100 0
Total (Indian Rupees) 10,700 2,100 300
1 USD = 45 INR
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at the slum level paved roads and solid waste management 
were provided.
The cost sharing was as shown on previous page.
Pro – poor accountability arrangements 
in SNP
• Slum residents partly pay for services. This ensures that 
the ULB, NGO and contractors become accountable to 
the residents and RAs.
• Slum residents do not pay user charges directly to the 
ULB or the NGO. This gives residents leverage in case 
the physical work was not up to standard or was not 
completed in time. 
• Slum residents individually save their contribution in 
a bank account that only they can operate. This gives 
leverage to individual residents in case the RA, NGO 
and contractor collude in terms of quality or time taken 
over service delivery.
• RAs have been formed to monitor progress and quality 
of physical works.
• RAs decide on the stage of service delivery and time to 
transfer their contributions to the ULB – this is based 
on pre determined parameters.
• Individual households approve transfer of funds from 
their individual accounts to the associations account, 
which is then transferred to the ULB’s account.
This arrangement ensured accountability for all partners 
in SNP
• The ULB is bound to deliver services on a pre-deter-
mined basis. If it does not deliver, then the RAs would 
not transfer resident’s contributions to the ULB.
• The quality of services and associated infrastructure is 
again pre-determined, based on the guidelines of the 
ULB’s minimum standards and schedule of rates. When 
services fall below minimum standards, slum residents 
individually and through resident’s association would 
point out anomalies and ensure that the poor quality 
structures were rebuilt. Again, the threat of not transfer-
ring contribution to the ULB’s is a deterrent.
• The contractors who carry out the physical works are ac-
countable to the RAs and NGO. If their work is not up to 
standard, the RAs complain to the NGO and ULB, who, 
in turn would pressurise the contractor. As a last resort, 
the RA would stop transfer of resident’s contribution.
• The slum residents became accountable – if they do not 
make their contributions, then they too are denied basic 
services till they paid their dues.
• The NGOs are accountable to the slum residents and as-
sociations. In case the ULB does not meet pre-determined 
timelines and quality, the residents would pressurize the 
NGO. 
• The NGOs are also accountable to the ULB when the 
slum resident associations do not transfer contributions 
to the ULB and similarly when individual residents have 
not saved and contributed as per schedule.
Case Studies
The case of Pravinagar Guptanagar 1 (PG1)
Pravinanagr-Guptanagar 1 (PG1) is a slum in the south 
west part of Ahmedabad City with a population of about 
6,000, living in 1200 households. It occupies an area of 
about 180,000 square meters. The slum was formed after 
the flooding of River Sabarmati in 1973, when some of the 
riverbank households moved to the site of PG slum. 
When Saath, a local NGO started its Integrated Slum 
Development Program in 1993, no basic services were pro-
vided by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. 10 public 
toilets and 4 public water posts were provided, however 
these were inadequate for the population. Some residents 
had built toilets with soak pits. Residents in some parts had 
also constructed a rudimentary drainage system which was 
not well designed or joined to the main city system resulting 
in frequent overflow.
Some lanes had managed to get a drainage line by paying 
about INR 1,000 to politically connected persons who used 
their influence in the AMC to get the lines laid.
Residents were not willing to wait any longer for free 
services, but were keen to get regular basic services by 
paying a user charge. This differed considerably from the 
myth that slum residents wanted free services. However, 
they had been cheated by various middlemen who had col-
lected initial fees for basic services under the guise of being 
AMC personnel. They were wary of the AMC but trusted 
the local NGO, Saath.
Saath and the residents of PG started negotiating with 
the AMC in 1996 to get basic services under the SNP. The 
AMC gave approval in 1997 and the residents started saving 
for user charges of INR 2,000 and maintenance fees of INR 
100 per household in individual savings bank accounts. The 
resident’s approved an AMC prepared design in Jan 1999 
work started in September 1999.
Six RAs were formed on the basis of caste and community 
identities. Each association played the roles of watchdog 
for quality control and design compliance, facilitator for 
resolving disputes arising out of location of manholes and 
widening of lanes and collector of usage charges.
When mutually agreed (by RAs and AMC) milestones 
were reached, the RAs would instruct the bank to transfer 
a certain amount from the resident’s individual account to 
the RA’s account, and then transfer the total amount to the 
AMC as user charges. 
On completion of works, 80 - 90% of the user charges were 
paid in stages. Some amounts have been retained by the RAs 
as they are not satisfied with the water supply system.
The case of Mohan bhai
Mohanbhai (name changed) is a resident of the Ranavas area 
of PG1. He is a worker for the Congress Political Party and 
has connections with the elected representatives of the ULB 
which he used to get basic services in the slum on a piecemeal 
basis. His modus operandi was to answer the pressing needs 
of residents in PG1 for drainage lines in a controlled (scarce 
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supply) manner. He would collect a down payment of almost 
INR 1,000 each from 30 residents in a lane under the guise 
of using the money to grease the palms of ULB officials. 
Once the down payment was given, he would get digging 
work started and would regularly extort money for getting 
the laying of drainage lines completed. The residents would 
end up paying almost Rs 2,000 for a drainage connection that 
was poorly designed and would regularly overflow, requir-
ing more money for maintenance – which again would be 
facilitated by Mohanbhai for a fee. The residents agreed to 
this arrangement because there was no alternative by which 
they could get a legal drainage connection.
Mohanbhai was aghast when he heard that all basic services 
were to be provided in PG1 with the user fees of Rs 2,000. 
He first claimed that this was a fraudulent scheme launched 
by the NGO. He then privately told the NGO that the SNP 
scheme provided too much for the user fees of Rs 2,000. 
He claimed that he could get residents to pay Rs 5,000 for 
the scheme if the NGO collaborated with him. Then the 
regular user charges of Rs 2,000 could be paid to the ULB 
and the remaining – unaccounted amount of Rs 3,000 could 
be shared between him and the NGO. After realizing that the 
mechanisms of ensuring accountability were too strong, he 
adapted himself to the situation by becoming the leader of 
a RA and claimed that he had used his political influence to 
the SNP project into PG1.
The case of Manuben 
Manuben lived in the Harijan Vas if PG1. Her community, 
being Harijans – the lowest in the Hindu caste system – lived 
in the lowest and most flood prone part of the slum where all 
the drainage and waste water would gather. Manuben would 
have to walk a kilometre and wait for about two hours to 
collect a pot of water from the common public standpost. 
She had to defecate in the open and there was no way that 
they could get rid of the waste water.
About 120 residents of the area had agreed to pay INR 1,000 
to Mohanbhai (a well connected political tout) for a drainage 
connection. However, the drainage lines were laid about one 
meter above the house floor level, raising a basic question 
of the design feasibility of the illegal drainage line. 
On hearing about the SNP scheme of the ULB, the resi-
dents met and formed an association called the Jay Bhim 
Association. They started collecting instalments towards the 
household contribution of INR 2,100. Manuben became a 
member of the managing committee of the association and 
was instrumental in convincing women residents about 
the benefits of the scheme, who in turn convinced their 
menfolk.
The physical work started in March 2000 and was com-
pleted by December 2002.
On completion of work, the resident’s found that unlike 
other parts of PG1, water was not reaching the taps in their 
households. Manuben, approached the NGO and the SNP 
cell of the ULB and also refused to pay further instalments 
to the ULB for the services on behalf of Jay Bhim Associa-
tion. In February 2003, the ULB relaid broader water supply 
lines, leading to acceptable water pressure in the taps. Jay 
Bhim Association then paid the due amount to the ULB. 
Today, Manuben facilitates regular maintenance of water 
and drainage systems by the ULB.
Glossary
AMC –  Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
RA  –  Resident’s Association
NGO  –  Non Governmental Organisation
ULB  –  Urban Local Body
PG1  –  Pravinagar Guptanagar 1
SNP  –  Slum Networking Project
INR  –  Indian Rupees
HH  –  Households
GT   –  Gulley Trap
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